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Corporate Misbehavior and Collective 
Values* 
Margaret Gilbert† 
“Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but 
induces men to disguise them or to abstain from any active effort at 
their diffusion.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years there have been many scandals in which 
highly paid corporate executives have apparently acted in 
morally unacceptable ways. Why is this? Is it a matter of a few 
“bad apples” or is there some other, or some additional, 
explanation? In order to answer such questions, one needs to 
know what the possibilities are: what, generally, goes on in the 
life of a corporation and its members? What factors might 
influence the behavior of a given executive or other member of 
the corporation?  
It is plausible to suggest that collective value judgments 
or, for short, collective values, are important components of 
corporate life and must be considered in examining immoral 
behavior within corporations. This article carefully articulates 
a particular interpretation of this idea. 
It is argued, first, that considerations of our everyday 
ascriptions of beliefs and value judgments to groups of people 
point away from an account of collective values that might 
initially be proposed. A different account is then offered. The 
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likely influence of collective values according to this account, 
and phenomena akin to them, is discussed. It is argued that 
they are indeed likely to be influential. To echo Mill in the 
above quotation, collective values are apt to induce people to 
abstain from any active effort to counter them. Some practical 
consequences for corporations and those concerned with them 
are then sketched. 
II. GROUP BELIEF STATEMENTS 
Among the possible sources of malfeasance that one 
finds informally proposed are a climate of opinion or corporate 
culture in which “anything goes” as long as the corporate 
bottom line—the maximization of profit—is served. Most 
people have a rough idea of what is at issue when a climate of 
opinion or a culture is mentioned. It is harder to say exactly 
what phenomena are in question. If we are to make more of 
this explanation of behavior, we need to go further. 
If pressed, many would most likely propose the 
following: the judgment that “anything goes” is part of the 
climate of opinion or corporate culture in a given corporation if 
and only if most of the people working for that corporation 
personally endorse that judgment. This accords with 
philosopher Anthony Quinton’s statement that “[i]n some 
cases, which may be called summative, statements about social 
objects are equivalent to statements otherwise the same that 
refer explicitly, if at some level of generality, to individual 
people. To say that the French middle class is thrifty is to say 
that most French middle class people are.”2  
It can be argued, however, that everyday statements 
about the beliefs and attitudes of social objects, to use 
Quinton’s phrase, are not always summative in his sense. That 
is, they are not always equivalent to statements “otherwise the 
same” that refer to individual people generally described.3 
Consider some further statements about the beliefs and 
attitudes of social objects: “The union believes management is 
being unreasonable,” “In the opinion of the court, this law is 
  
 2 Anthony Quinton, Social Objects, 75 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 9, 17 
(1975).  
 3 See MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 257-88 (1992) [hereinafter 
GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS]; see also MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER: 
RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION 195-214 (1996) [hereinafter GILBERT, LIVING 
TOGETHER]. The text, below, draws on these and related discussions. 
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unconstitutional,” “Corporations value nothing but profit,” 
“Our family favored Bush,” “We”—said by an unmarried 
couple—“want to get married.” If it is sometimes appropriate to 
take these as summative statements, it is surely not always so.  
After all, in many cases, a formal voting procedure 
determines what the social object or group believes. What 
counts as far as any individual group member goes, then, is his 
or her vote—not what he or she personally believes. Evidently, 
one’s voting in favor of the proposition that, say, Arthur was 
the best candidate for the position does not logically entail that 
one personally takes this proposition to be true.  
Less formal processes are also taken to determine what 
a group believes. These can be argued to be analogous to the 
case of voting insofar as public expressions as opposed to 
private thoughts are what matter. Thus, after some discussion, 
a literary discussion group may reach a point of quiescence 
after which no one would dispute that “We thought Plath’s 
poem a very strong one.”  
It appears, then, that there is an important sense in 
which for a group to believe something (or value it in a certain 
way or want it, and the like) it is not necessary that all or most 
of the members believe it. Were group belief statements always 
summative statements in Quinton’s sense this would not be so. 
Given this sense of group belief (and so on), is it 
sufficient for a group to believe something that all or most of 
the members do? Apparently not. Consider a court. A certain 
matter may not yet have come before it. It would then seem 
right to say that, as yet, the court has no opinion on the matter. 
The individual justices may, at the same time, have definite 
personal opinions about it. What they think, however, does not 
determine what the court now thinks. This is true even if the 
court is in session and the matter in question is before it. All 
may be of the same personal opinion but before a vote is taken, 
the court itself has none.  
The same goes for less formal groups as well. Asked 
what her discussion group thought of a particular poem, 
someone might respond, with some emphasis, “The group has 
no opinion: we’ve not discussed it!” At the same time, she would 
acknowledge it to be perfectly possible that all of the members 
have the same personal view of the poem. 
In sum, everyday group belief (value, goal, and other) 
statements are not always interpretable as summative 
statements. In other words, when we talk of a group’s belief, we 
may well be talking about something other than what all or 
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most of the members believe. What, then, are we talking about? 
In what follows I refer to the phenomenon in question simply 
as group belief.  
III. OBSERVATION: THE STANDING TO REBUKE  
One clue as to what defines a group belief has to do with 
informal rebukes or reproof. A rebuke is a form—albeit a mild 
form—of punishment.4 I take it that although one can cause 
pain to someone without any special standing, one cannot 
punish them without such standing.5 Similarly, one can speak 
harshly to a person without any special authority, but one 
cannot rebuke them without such authority. This is supported 
by the fact that people sometimes respond to purported 
rebukes in such terms as, “What’s that to you?” or “What 
business is that of yours?” 
In contexts where group members believe their group to 
have a particular belief, they understand that they have the 
standing to rebuke any member who bluntly expresses the 
opposite belief. Opposed to a “blunt” expression is one that 
makes it clear that the speaker is “speaking personally.” That 
the other parties have the standing to rebuke the member in 
question appears to be a function of the collective belief itself.6  
This clue is, perhaps, little more than a provocation or a 
question. What is it about group belief that gives the group 
members the standing to rebuke each other for blunt 
expressions of a contrary opinion? An adequate account of 
group belief should give a plausible answer. 
IV. THE PLURAL SUBJECT ACCOUNT OF A GROUP’S BELIEF  
The foregoing discussion suggests three criteria of 
adequacy for an account of a group’s belief. Such an account 
should explain how the existence of such a belief gives the 
group members the standing to rebuke each other for bluntly 
expressing a view contrary to that belief. It should neither 
logically entail that all or most of the parties personally have 
the belief in question nor should it suppose that if all or most of 
  
 4 Cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 11 (1961).  
 5 Perhaps it should be said that “one cannot punish someone in the strict 
sense of ‘punish’ without a special standing,” since at this point the term “punish” 
would appear to have both a broader and a narrower (the so-called “strict”) meaning. 
 6 For extended discussion on this point see GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER, 
supra note 3, at 200-03. 
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the members have a given belief then the group believes it. For 
the former is not necessary for group belief and the latter is not 
sufficient for group belief. 
The following account of group belief—whose terms will 
be explained—meets all of these criteria.7 Here the letter p 
stands for any particular proposition. 
A group, G, believes that p if and only if its members are 
jointly committed to believe as a body that p.  
Two aspects of this account need to be explained: what 
is a joint commitment, and what is it to be jointly committed to 
believe something as a body? These will now be discussed in 
turn. 
What is joint commitment, as understood here? The 
answer to that question can usefully be broken down into two 
parts, one concerning the commitment side of things, the other 
relating to joint-ness.  
The relevant general concept of commitment is 
illustrated, for example, in the following judgment: if Sandra 
decides to read the newspaper this evening, then she is 
committed to doing so. In the case of a personal decision such 
as Sandra’s, the commitment is personal. That is, the one 
whose commitment it is creates it unilaterally and is in a 
position unilaterally to do away with it. I take it that, once 
committed, Sandra has reason to read the newspaper and will 
continue to do so unless and until she rescinds her decision. 
The concept of a joint commitment is the concept of a 
commitment of two or more people. It is not a conjunction of the 
personal commitment of one party with the personal 
commitment(s) of the other(s).8  
Joint commitments can be created in various ways. One 
such way is to informally agree that one or more of the parties 
to the agreement is to act in a certain way. Less explicit means 
are also possible. Absent special background understandings, 
what is needed generally speaking is an expression of readiness 
by all parties to be jointly committed in the relevant way, in 
  
 7 This account was introduced in Margaret Gilbert, Modeling Collective 
Belief, 84 SYNTHESE 185, 185-204, reprinted in GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER, supra note 
3, at 195-214, and has been further elaborated in subsequent publications. 
 8 For more detail see generally Margaret Gilbert, The Structure of the Social 
Atom: Joint Commitment as the Foundation of Human Social Behavior, in SOCIALIZING 
METAPHYSICS 39 (Frederick Schmitt ed. 2003); Margaret Gilbert, A Theoretical 
Framework for the Understanding of Teams, in TEAMWORK: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 22, 29-30 (Natalie Gold ed., 2005) (responding to some queries about 
joint commitment). 
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conditions of “common knowledge.” Common knowledge is 
intended here in roughly the sense introduced by the 
philosopher David Lewis.9 Rather than going into the details of 
that here, suffice it to say that the expressions in question 
must be “out in the open” as far as the parties are concerned. In 
parallel with the conditions of its creation, the—more or less 
explicit—concurrence of all is required for the dissolution of a 
given joint commitment. 
There may be special background understandings that 
impact upon how joint commitments are formed. For example, 
people may jointly commit to believe as a body whatever a 
certain person says about the group. Thus the members of the 
board of a corporation may be jointly committed to believe as a 
body whatever the chairman of the board says about the 
corporation. As a consequence of this background commitment, 
if the chairman says that the corporation is doing fine, then the 
other members of the board are jointly committed to believe as 
a body that the corporation is doing fine. Given this 
background, the chairman need not heed to what anyone else 
does or thinks: the board will believe whatever he says about 
the corporation. 
A given joint commitment can always be described in a 
sentence of the following form: the parties are jointly 
committed to x as a body. Acceptable substitutions for x are 
psychological verbs such as “believe,” “value,” “intend,” and so 
on. What is it to be jointly committed to x as a body? This can 
be spelled out further as follows: it is to be jointly committed to 
constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that xs. The 
guiding idea of a single body that xs includes nothing about the 
intrinsic nature of the single body in question. In particular, it 
does not imply that it is in some way made up of two or more 
distinct bodies who are its members. Thus there is no 
circularity in the proposed account of group belief. It does not 
say that a group believes that p if and only if its members are 
jointly committed to constitute, as far as possible, a group that 
believes that p. The point is, rather, that if and only if they are 
jointly committed to constitute, as far as is possible, a single 
body that believes that p, they will constitute a group that 
believes it. 
  
 9 DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 52-60 (1969). See 
also GILBERT, SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 3, at 188. 
 8/16/2005 10:14:17 AM 
2005] CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR AND COLLECTIVE VALUES 1375 
V. JOINT COMMITMENT AND THE STANDING TO REBUKE 
It can be argued that by virtue of their participation in a 
joint commitment, the parties gain a special standing in 
relation to one another’s actions. To put it briefly, each can call 
on the other in the name of the joint commitment. If one 
violates it, for instance, he has not violated a commitment that 
is his alone, but a commitment to which others can lay claim. 
Each can say: “You violated our commitment.” 
Important aspects of the special standing of the parties 
in relation to one another are as follows. The parties to a joint 
commitment are answerable to one another with respect to 
their conformity. Further, one who violates a joint commitment 
has offended against all of the parties to the joint commitment, 
as such. The offense in question can plausibly be characterized 
in terms of a violation of right. In other words, when I am 
subject to a joint commitment requiring me to do certain 
things, all of the parties to the commitment have a right 
against me to the relevant actions. Correlatively, I am under 
an obligation to all of them to perform these actions. These 
obligations and rights are derived directly from the joint 
commitment.10 They are not a matter of moral principle.11 Once 
it exists, they exist also, irrespective of the surrounding 
circumstances.12  
In consequence of the existence of these rights and 
obligations, failing special background circumstances, those 
who are party to a joint commitment have the standing to 
demand that others conform to it, if non-conformity is 
threatened. They also have the standing to rebuke one another 
for defaults that have taken place.  
  
 10 For amplification see MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 50-70 (2000) (discussing obligation in relation 
to joint commitment).  
 11 I have in mind a general moral principle such as philosopher Thomas 
Scanlon’s Principle of Fidelity. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in 
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 86, 95 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) (discussing the 
Principle as “Principle F”). For a critique of Scanlon’s account of promissory obligation, 
see Margaret Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ 
Rights, 83, 94 (Feb. 2004) (arguing that one cannot account for the rights of a promise 
by reference to a moral principle such as Scanlon’s).  
 12 See GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER, supra note 3, at 305 (stating that coercive 
circumstances do not affect the obligating quality of joint commitments). See also 
MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (forthcoming) (stating that 
joint commitments with immoral content obligate in the usual way; it may well be that 
one ought not to fulfill such an obligation, all things considered). 
 8/16/2005 10:14:17 AM 
1376 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:4 
The present author uses the phrase “plural subject” as a 
technical term to refer to those who are jointly committed to x 
as a body, for some x.13 Those who are jointly committed to x as 
a body constitute, by her definition, the plural subject of x-ing. 
Accordingly, one can label the above account of group belief the 
plural subject account. 
There are some important aspects of that account that 
have not yet been discussed. A joint commitment to believe as a 
body that p does not require each participant personally to 
believe anything. The requirement at issue is precisely to 
constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that believes that 
p. It does not concern any other bodies that may bear some 
relation, however close, to the body in question. 
More positively, the joint commitment will be fulfilled, 
to some extent at least, if those concerned say that p in 
appropriate contexts, with an appropriate degree of confidence, 
and do not call p or obvious corollaries into question. Their 
behavior generally should be expressive of the belief that p, in 
the appropriate contexts. That does not mean that they must 
personally have that belief. In other words, this expressive 
behavior need not connote or be the expression of a personal 
belief that p.  
Certain contextual conditions are likely to be 
understood. Thus, for example, members of a seminar on rights 
may form a joint commitment to believe as a body that the 
notion of a group right is a viable one. This would involve a 
requirement to express that belief when acting as a member of 
the seminar. Presumably the parties are not always so acting. 
If a friend who is not a member of the seminar engages one of 
them on the topic in the middle of a picnic, it would presumably 
be appropriate for each to speak in propria persona, without 
preamble.  
Suppose, however, that one is in a context where it is 
appropriate to act in accordance with a given joint 
commitment. It is then open to one to use such qualifiers as 
“Personally speaking,” to preface the expression of a belief 
contrary to the collective one. This makes it clear that one is 
indeed now speaking for oneself and not as a member of the 
relevant group. One makes it clear that one’s utterance is not a 
violation of the joint commitment in question. This is one way 
in which the plural subject account of group belief accords with 
  
 13 See generally GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS, supra note 3.  
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the logic of “Our group believes that p” and so on, as this is 
understood in everyday life. It allows for the possibility that a 
party to a supposed group belief aver without fault—though 
not necessarily without danger—that he personally does not 
believe that p. 
What danger might there be in making such an avowal? 
Other members may subsequently regard one with suspicion, 
thinking one more liable to default on the joint commitment, 
either inadvertently or deliberately. If one does default, they 
have the standing to rebuke one for doing so. They may also 
begin to think of one as an “outsider.” To be regarded with 
suspicion, to be thought of as “not one of us,” to risk 
inadvertently incurring rebukes, are things that most people 
would prefer to avoid. It is clear then that group beliefs 
according to the plural subject account are likely to suppress 
the development of contrary ideas at both the individual and 
the collective level.  
VI. COLLECTIVE BELIEFS, VALUES, GOALS 
The plural subject account of a group’s belief that p may 
well articulate a central everyday conception. Among other 
things, it meets the criteria noted earlier: it explains the 
standing of the parties to rebuke each other for bluntly 
speaking as if p were false, and it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for group belief, on this account, that most members 
of the group personally believe that p. It is necessary and 
sufficient only that they are jointly committed to believe that p 
as a body. Whatever its relationship to everyday conceptions, if 
there are group beliefs in the sense of the plural subject 
account, they will be an important aspect of the lives of the 
parties to them.  
In what follows group beliefs as these are understood on 
the plural subject account will be referred to as collective 
beliefs. Members of a given population—members of the board 
of a certain corporation, for instance—will be said collectively to 
believe that p, by definition, if they are jointly committed to 
believe as a body that p.  
Analogous plural subject accounts can be given 
collective values, collective goals and intentions, and so on. As 
to collective values, the relevant account would run along the 
following lines: “Members of population P collectively value 
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item I in a certain way if and only if they are jointly committed 
to value item I in that way as a body.”14 
Evidently, in relation to the ideas about corporations 
mentioned at the outset of this discussion, one might interpret 
the idea of a climate of opinion or corporate culture in such 
terms. If members of a given corporation were jointly 
committed to value as a body the maximization of the 
corporation’s profits above everything else, one could 
reasonably say that such valuation of the maximization of 
profit was part of that corporation’s culture. Important parts or 
accompaniments of this culture would be collective beliefs of a 
factual nature, such as beliefs about the capabilities and 
temperament of various corporate executives, and collective 
goals and plans. 
It is plausible to hypothesize that there are collective 
values and beliefs according to the definitions given. That is, it 
is plausible to hypothesize that in the world as it is, there are a 
variety of such phenomena. This hypothesis, like the plural 
subject account of group belief, is based on observation of the 
judgments people make in the context of their ascriptions of 
beliefs to groups and so on. On the assumption that such 
phenomena abound among those living and working together, 
in corporations and elsewhere, the concluding sections of this 
discussion briefly discuss their nature as rational motivators, 
and some practical implications for those who are concerned 
about morally unacceptable behavior in the corporate realm. 
VII. COLLECTIVE BELIEFS, VALUES, AND GOALS AS RATIONAL 
MOTIVATORS 
Something may be considered a rational motivator if the 
behavior of a perfectly rational agent would be influenced by it, 
all else being equal. A perfectly rational agent, for purposes of 
this idea, is one who always acts as reason dictates he should 
act.15 Thus, he does whatever he has reason to do, all else being 
equal.  
  
 14 For a different version, still in plural subject terms, see generally Margaret 
Gilbert, Shared Values, Social Unity, and Liberty, 19 PUB. AFFAIRS Q. 25, 33 (2005). 
For present purposes the precise details of the account are not important. 
 15 I take it that one may have reason to do something irrespective of one’s 
own preference ranking of the various possible outcomes of one’s action. The conception 
of the dictates of rationality at issue here, then, is different from that employed in the 
mathematical theory of games. 
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I take it that perfectly rational participants will be 
motivated by their joint commitments. That is, all else being 
equal, a perfectly rational agent who is party to a joint 
commitment will conform to that commitment. If he is jointly 
committed with other members of the firm to assigning as a 
body the highest possible value to the maximization of his 
firm’s profits, then all else being equal, he will act in ways 
expressive of such valuing. Insofar as human beings are at 
least imperfectly rational agents, their joint commitments are 
liable to motivate them in a similar way. This does not mean 
that, all things considered, it would be rational to pursue the 
corporate bottom line come what may. All else being equal, one 
is rationally required to conform to a commitment, but all else 
may not be equal. Morality, many would say, is an external 
consideration—one not founded in the corporation, at least—
that may change the picture.  
Of course, if you violate a standing joint commitment for 
moral reasons, you will be liable to the rebukes of at least your 
less morally aware colleagues. Your preference to avoid such 
rebukes, or worse, may lead you not to violate the commitment. 
Depending on one’s colleagues and one’s circumstances, it may 
be little short of heroic for one to violate the commitment. It 
may then be that even morally speaking it is permissible for 
you not to take a moral stand. Evidently, much depends on the 
case. 
VIII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Collective values and factual beliefs make a difference. 
If one wishes to understand the pressures on corporate 
executives and other members of corporations to behave in a 
manner contrary to central moral principles, one must be 
aware of the collective values, beliefs, and goals to which they 
are party.  
These may work to stifle the expression of moral 
concerns. To echo my opening quotation from J. S. Mill, 
collective beliefs, values and goals are apt to induce people to 
disguise their contrary opinions—however morally 
perspicacious—and to abstain from any active effort at their 
diffusion. Indeed, contrary to the suggestion in the quotation, 
they may tend to root out opposing opinions themselves. Forced 
regularly to couch their arguments in terms of profit 
maximization, or other corporate goals, executives and other 
members of a corporation may simply lose sight of moral 
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constraints and values they previously held. At first, executives 
may cease to understand fully the constraining maxims they 
previously endorsed, and gradually they may cease to entertain 
them. 
How might a situation of this kind be rectified? If in a 
corporate context adherence to central moral norms is highly 
valued collectively, then this will encourage the critique of 
other collective assumptions. If the members of corporation C 
collectively accept that certain moral constraints must rein in 
the pursuit of corporate profit, respecting such constraints will 
be collectively understood as part of being a good corporate 
citizen. The same goes, of course, for any other type of 
citizenship. 
 
